Government economic policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Government economic policy - Essay Example This paper describes main economic objectives set by different governments all over the world and the its economic policies carried out by them to guide the economy towards achieving these objectives. The policies of governments can be referred to as macroeconomic policy while the policies of smaller entities like business organizations are called micro economic policies. Both these sets of economic policies have a dynamic relationship with each other and affect each other significantly. Both these sets of economic policies have a dynamic relationship with each other and affect each other significantly. There are four economic objectives that are espoused as standard. These are: full employment or stated low unemployment; stability of prices; rate of economic growth, determined by the government; and the maintaining of the Balance of Payments in equilibrium. In its simplest form full employment measures those who are employed out of those who are employable.The attraction in full employment as an economic objective is the potential it provides to maximize production while leading to enhance standards of living. The reverse side of the coin is that it reduces economic and thereby social dysfunctions. Managing inflation to an acceptable level is the objective of price stability. In recent times there are other objectives that have been added on to the macro economy and they have to do with the management of the social and natural spheres through macroeconomic policy. One such an objective is ensuring a more equal distribution of wealth in society and the second is the managing of the environment to ensure that economic activity does not adversely affect the environment ... It also makes sound decision making and allocation of resources more tedious. Inflation is measured as the annual rate of change of the Retail Price Index (RPI). When inflation is kept low prices remain stable, which augurs well for all governments. The next objective refers to economic growth. It is deemed as attractive when the rate is both high and can be sustained. The measure used is the rate of change of countries Gross Domestic Product. The effect of inflation has to be negated for it to be an acceptable measure therefore what’s measured is real GDP, which is GDP with the effect of inflation negated. The final of the four traditional objectives is the maintenance of the balance of payments equilibrium. This could also be called maintenance of external stability, which in turn ensures confidence in the international markets of a countries economy. Managing the foreign debt of a country does this. In recent times there are other objectives that have been added on to the m acro economy and they have to do with the management of the social and natural spheres through macro economic policy. One such objective is ensuring a more equal distribution of wealth in society and the second is the managing of the environment to endure that economic activity does not adversely affect the environment like the depletion of resources to levels where it cannot be replenished or pollution. Economic policy actions can vary from manipulation of interest rates by a central finance authority such as the Federal Reserve, regulating the expenditure of governments, taxes as well as interventions such as property rights of private individuals. An example of such

Sodium acetate Essay Example for Free

Sodium acetate Essay Claim: Relatively pure isoamyl acetate was isolated by elimination reaction as compared to the SN2 reaction. Evidence1: A flask containing isoamyl bromide (6 ml, 0. 050 mole) and potassium acetate (6 g, 0. 05 mole) in 10 ml of dimethyl formamide was positioned in a steam bath and then mounted on a magnetic stirrer. The mixture was heated and magnetically stirred simultaneously for two hours. A white precipitate was found at the bottom of the solution. The mixture was set to cool and 15 ml of cool water was then added to the mixture. The entire precipitate dissolved in the mixture and the content of the flask now got transformed into a clear colorless solution. The mixture was then washed with 15 ml of ether. The lower, aqueous layer in the flask was drawn off and the ethereal was again washed by 5 ml of water. The ethereal was then dried using magnesium sulfate and the ethereal was then gravity filtered. The ether was completely removed by simple distillation1 using steam as a source of heat. The residual crude isoamyl acetate was isolated by simple distillation using a flame as a heat source. Isoamyl acetate; 4. 721 g, 36. 3 mmole, 72. 6 % recovery, B. p= 137? C – 142? C (lit=142? C2). The isoamyl acetate was then tested by infrared spectroscopy (IR spectroscopy); C-H stretch: below 3000 cm, C=O stretch: 1750 cm, C-O stretch: 1250 cm (Appendix 1, 2) Discussion: Isoamly acetate was isolated by SN2 nucleophilic substitution method. It was observed that the Nucleophile, acetate ion directly displaced the bromide ion by substitution. The experiment used potassium acetate rather than sodium acetate. Potassium is larger and less dense than sodium so that the acetate ions more readily take part in the reaction. DMF, a polar aprotic solvent, was used to destabilize the nucleophile that catalyzes the reaction by lowering energy. After the mixture was cooled, water was added to the mixture in order to avert a reverse reaction. The mixture was washed with ether in order to maximize the yield of the produce by the process of dehydration. Any presence of water would cause the reverse reaction, thus minimizing the yield. isoamly acetate was also isolated by elimination reaction, technically termed as fisher esterification. The fisher esterification was favored over SN2 reaction in this experiment. A flame was used as a heat source in the elimination reaction while a steam was used as a heat source in the Sn2 reaction. At higher temperatures, molecules acquire enough energy to climb the energy barrier. This barrier level will be too high to cross at lower temperatures.

A review of capital structure theories

A review of capital structure theories 1.0 Introduction One of the most contentious financial issues that have provoked intense academic research during the last decades is the theory of capital structure. Capital structure can be defined as a Mix of different securities issued by a firm (Brealey and Myers, 2003). Simply speaking, capital structure mainly contains two elements, debt and equity. In 1958, through combining tax and debt factors in a simple model to price the value of a company, Modigliani and Miller firstly begin to explore a modern capital structure theory, and their work inspired this area study. However, the MM theory has no practical use because it lacks of direct guidance for companies to determine capital structure in real life (Baxter, 1967; Sarig and Warga, 1989; Vernimmen et al, 2005). During the past years, researchers strived to establish a more reasonable capital structure theory that can be put into practices efficiently, and they attempted to expand debt ratio and tax advantage factors into a new area. Myers (1984) states that only practical capital structure theories, which introducing adjustment cost that includes agency cost and information asymmetry problems, could provide a useful guidance for firms to determine their capital structure. However, from recent studies, Myers (2001) believes that how information differences and agency costs influence the capital structure is still an open question. From this perspective, it is very important to review the development of these two factors which make theoretical research having a strong relationship with reality. Thus, this project will summarize the capital structure theories orientated by agency cost and asymmetric information from extant literature. Also some gaps and conflicts among theories of capital structure will be found and discussed in order to further improve this area study. The rest of this project is arranged as follows. Section 2 will present the theories based on agency costs that causes the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders or managers. Section 3 will illustrate from two areas, interplay of capital structure and investment, followed by signal effect of debt ratio, to show the theories based on asymmetric information. In conclusion, Section 4 will summarize the entire essay and suggest further research direction of capital structure theory. 2.0 Capital structure theories based on agency costs Although Berry and Means (1931, cited in Myers, 2001) state an adverse relationship between the separated ownership and corporate control status, it commonly admits that Jensen and Meckling (1976) firstly conducted the research in how agency costs determine capital structure (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Over the past decades, researchers have tried to add agency costs to capital structure models (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The perfect alignment between firm investors and firm agencies, such as managers, does not exist (Myers, 2001). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), company agents, the managers, always emphasize on their own interests, such as high salary and reputation. Also these company agents use entrenching investments, which make the asset and capital structure orientated by the managements knowledge and skills, to increase their bargaining power with the true company holders (Chen and Kensinger, 1992). However, Myers (2001) believes that the firm holders can reduce such transferred value through using different kinds of methods of control and supervising, but he further points out the weakness that these methods are expensive and reduce returns. As a result, the perfect monitoring system is out of work, and agency costs are produced from these conflicts. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conflicts between investors and agencies are generally divided into two types. The first conflict occurs between debt holders and equity holders, and the second conflict is from between equity holders and managers. Consequently, all the capital structure theories based on agency costs can be also classified based on these two conflicts. In the rest of this section, each individual conflict will be separately discussed. 2.1 Conflicts between Debt holders and Equity holders Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs problems happen in determining the structure of a firms capital when the conflict between debt holders and equity holders is caused by debt contracts. Similar to Jensen and Mecklings conclusion, Myers (1977) observes that since equity holders bear the whole cost of the investment and debt holders get the main part of the profits from the investment, equity holders may have no interest in investing in value-increasing businesses when companies are likely to face bankruptcy in the short term future. Thus, if debt occupies a large part of firms capital, it will lead to the rejection of investing in more value-increased business projects. However, in 1991, Harris and Raviv cast a contrasting opinion to adjust the capital structure theory based on this conflict. They point out that most debt contracts give equity holders a push power to invest sub-optimally investment project. If the investment fails, due to limited liability, debt holders bear the consequences of a decline of the debt value, but equity holders get most of yields if the investment could generate returns above the debt par value. In order to prevent debt holders from receiving unfair treatment, equity holders normally get less for the debt than original expectation from debt holders. Thus, the agency costs are created by equity holders who issue the debt rather than debt holders reason (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Tradeoff capital structure theory has a basic and strong relationship with this type of agency costs. However, different researchers hold various explanations of the relationship. Myers (1977) points out the debt cost reason, Green (1984) announces that convertible bonds can reduce the asset substitution problem which comes from the tradeoff theory, Stulz and Johnson (1985) consider about collateral effect. In the end, only Diamond model (1989) is widely accepted. If Equity holders do not consider reputational reason, they are willing to trade relatively safe projects, but this activity will lead to less debt financing (Diamond, 1989; Mike et al, 1997). Diamond model (1989) assumes two tradeoffs, risky and risk-free, to show that the debt repayment should consider both possible investment plans. Furthermore, Mike et al (1997) use empirical evidence to indicate how to use debt to trade off these two optional investment plans. Moreover, in 1991, Harris and Raviv expanded Diamonds model to three investment choices. They point out that one choice of investment can only contain the risk-free project, one option can invest in risk project and the last option combine both risk-free and risk projects. In fact, since the reputation factor is vital for a manager, managers are willing to choose risk-free investment projects that have more possibility of success. Consequently, the amount of debt is often reduced by managers. 2.2 Conflicts between Managers and Equity holders Jensen and Meckling (1976) also states that conflicts naturally arise between managers and equity holders since managers just hold parts of the whole firms capital. Consequently, firm mangers only benefit from part of the profit generated by their business activities, but they simultaneously bear the whole cost of these actions. However, Myer (2001) casts a different opinion about the reason of the conflict and claims that in fact, managers never bear the full costs of the business activities unless the manager is also the firms investor. He further maintains that the real cause of the conflict is due to an imperfect observable reward system between investors and managers, because both parties have different standpoints to measure their own interest, especially the rewards. There are two dominant models, the Harris and Raviv model and the Stulz model, to explain this area. Although both models have a common assumption that labor contracts cannot address the conflict between managers and equity holders, both models hold different opinions about debt release and the problem in the drawbacks of debt in the capital structure. According to Harris and Raviv model (1990), managers are designed to want to continue the companys current operations all the time even if equity holders prefer the liquidation of the company. However, in Stulz model (1990), managers are keen to invest all available funds even if the equity holders can benefit from paying out cash. Moreover, Harris and Raviv (1990) point out that debt alleviates the agency costs and the conflict results from giving equity holders the chance to speed up liquidation when cash flows are hard to predict. In contrast, Stulz (1990) based on Jenson model (1986) concludes that debt payments reduce free cash flow. He further maintains that the debt costs reduce the available funds of a profitable project, since the costs result from debt payment that more than exhausts free cash flow. As a result, capital structure can be determined by trading off debt advantages against debt costs. 3.0 Capital structure theories based on asymmetric information The development of information modeling provides a possible approach to explain capital structure. In these capital structure theories, company insiders, such as managers, are assumed to obtain all private information about the investment opportunities or investment return. Some theories try to find out how the allocation of capital structure passes the insiders information of a firm to outsiders. Meanwhile, in other theories, the purpose of the capital structure is to improve efficiencies in the companys investment activities under asymmetric information (Vernimmen et al, 2005). The rest of this section will be divided into two subsections based on both sets of theories mentioned above. 3.1 Interplay of capital structure and investment This area of research begins with two vital academic papers, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the firms equity will be mispriced by the market when investors obtain less information of one firms assets value than the firms current insiders. Moreover, they further point out that if firms issue equity to absorb capital for a new investment, mispricing may make a net loss to the firms current shareholders. In Myers second paper (1984), he formally defines this as a pecking order capital structure theory. In this theory, a firms capital structure is determined by the purpose of the company to finance new investment. Furthermore, with the development of the Myers pecking order theory, researchers find some vital empirical implications of this theory. Krasker (1986) confirms the results of Myers theory (1984) and also shows that the larger the equity issue, the worse the asymmetric information problem and the firm with worse asymmetric information problems will often have a more under price problem. Ebsen (1986) finds that if managers could trade their firms new equity, the under price problem caused by asymmetric information will be reduced. Then Dierkens (1991) argues that the under price problem can be solved by information releases such as annual financial statement reports. However, some economists cast a doubt on the pecking order theory. These theoretical researches have a common feature that they all put investment situations under the pecking order theory but provide more finance choices for a firm. Brennan and Kraus (1987) state that it is not necessary for a firm to have a preference for financing through debt over equity and the under price problem can be addressed through various financing options and simple capital structure rather than solving asymmetry information problem. Their findings are also confirmed by Noe (1988). Moreover, in 1993, Nachman and Noe put Brennan and Kraus theory into practice and also come to the same conclusion. 3.2 Signal effect of debt ratio After discussing models which investigate the interplay of capital structure and investment, it is vital to turn to models in which investment is a fixed factor and only capital structure is regarded as a private information signal. The investigation of this area starts with the work of Ross (1977). According to Rosss capital structure theory, only firms insiders, such as managers, can get full information of the firms return distribution, but investors cannot. The main empirical implication of Ross theory is that there is a positive relation between firm value and debt ratio. However, further research combines debt and dividend policy together to show an opposite opinion that a firm value is determined by dividend and debt ratio rather than a single factor of debt ratio (Vernimem et al, 2005). Furthermore, in 1982, Heinkel improve Ross model. His model is similar to Ross but does not have the same assumption. Instead, high market value firms are assumed to have high total value but low quality debt, thus high market value firms has high equity value. This finding has been consistent with further capital structure theoretical research (Franke, 1987; John, 1987). Another debt ratio signal model is built by Poitevin (1989). He firstly points out the potential competition between an entrant and an incumbent under the asymmetric information. According to Poitevin model (1989), the marginal costs of entrant are private information obtained only by the entrant, and in a stable situation, the capital of high cost entrants does not issue any debt while low cost entrants never issue equity. However, Glazer and Israel (1990) cast a different conclusion against Poitevin. They maintain that low cost entrants are willing to issue equity since they can much easier use this finance approach to reduce marginal production costs than the high cost entrants. Nevertheless, Harris and Raviv (1991) point out the weakness of the Glazer and Israel model is that they ignore the dividends finance factor which has the same signal effect as debt. Normally, a capital structure theory should combine various basic finance factors together. In the end, Glazer and Israel recognize this weakness and claim that their results cannot be considered as a capital structure theory. 4.0 Summary and Conclusion To sum up, this literature review of capital structure theories is element arranged. The set of theories based on agency costs and the set of theories based on asymmetric information are separately presented in the passage. Moreover, each set of theories can also be divided into several subsections. Agency costs cause two types of conflicts among stakeholders, and these conflicts affect a firms choice of capital structure. Moreover, capital structure theories show that under an asymmetric information situation, capital structure has a strong reaction with investment activities and debt ratio has a signaling utility for the determination of capital structure. The range of the selected paper is from 1958 to 2005. These papers cover majority parts of the study including agency costs, interplay of capital structure and investment, imperfect information situations and debt signal effect. Also these papers are all from core financial journals, e.g. Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial Management, American Economic Review and Review of Financial Studies. Thus, this literature review can be considered to be efficient and thorough. This essay covers a considerable number of literatures which can present modern theoretical findings of capital structure. However, it should be noticed that the blooming period of capital structure theory is between 1970s-1980s. After 1990, the theoretical research seems to have developed very slowly, and the majority of papers in this field just review former findings since few new theories of capital structure come out. The direction of the theoretical research of capital structure should incline to be more practical. The future study should be extended in two areas. (1) Add psychosocial conditions and assumptions to improve extant capital structure theories. It is important to acknowledge that most capital structure theories cannot be used by companies in real life since these theories lacks of more reality factors. Thus, behavior finance could provide a new approach to extant theories. (2)Combine agency costs and asymmetric information problems together in one capital structure theory. Currently, both problems are discussed separately. However, companies often suffer from these two problems at the same time when they determine their capital structure. Consequently, it is necessary to set up a new theory based on both problems. Bibliography 1. Baxter, N. (1967) Leverage, risk of ruin, and the cost of capital, Journal of Finance, 22, pp. 395-403. 2. Brealey, R. A. and Myers, S. C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edn. New York: The McGraw-Hill Company. 3. Brennan, M. and Alan, K. (1987) Efficient financing under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance, 42, pp 1225-1243. 4. Chen, A. H. and Kensinger, J. (1992) Uncommon Equity, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(1), pp. 36-43. 5. Diamond, D. W. (1989) Reputation acquisition in debt markets, Journal of Political Economy, 97, pp. 828-862. 6. Dierkens, N. (1991) Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(2), pp.181-199. 7. Ebsen, E. (1986) The Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics. 15(1), pp. 119-152. 8. Franke, G. (1987) Costless signaling in financial markets, Journal of Finance, 42, pp.809-822. 9. Glazer, and Israel, R. (1990) Managerial incentives and financial signaling in product market competition, International Journal of Industrial Economics, 8, pp. 271-280. 10. Green, R.C. (1984) Investment incentives, debt, and warrants, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp. 115-136. 11. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1990) Capital structure and the informational role of debt, Journal of Finance, 45, pp.321-349. 12. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1991) The Theory of Capital Structure, The Journal of Finance, 46(1), pp. 297-355. 13. Heinkel, R. (1982) A theory of capital structure relevance under imperfect information, Journal of Finance, 37, pp.1141-1150. 14. Jensen, M. C. and William, H. M. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Management, 3(4), pp. 305- 360. 15. Jenson, M. C. (1986) Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, American Economic Review, 76(2), pp. 323-29. 16. John, K. (1987) Risk-shifting incentives and signaling through corporate capital structure, Journal of Finance, 42, pp. 623-641. 17. Krasker, W. (1986) Stock price movements in response to stock issues under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance, 41, pp. 93-105. 18. Leland, H.E. (1994) Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, 49(4), pp. 1213-1252. 19. Mike, B., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1997) Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp. 693-728. 20. Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958) The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment, American Economic Review, 48, pp.261-297. 21. Myers, S. C. (1977) Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics, (5), pp. 147-175. 22. Myers, S.C. (1984) The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39, pp.575-592. 23. Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp.187-221. 24. Myers, S. C. (2001) Capital Structure, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), PP. 18-102. 25. Nachman, David C. and Noe, T. H. (1993) Design of securities under asymmetric information, Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology. 26. Noe, T. (1988) Capital structure and signaling game equilibria, Review of Financial Studies, 1, pp. 331-356. 27. Poitevin, M. (1989) Financial signaling and the deep-pocket argument, Rand Journal of Economics, 20, pp.26-40. 28. Ross, S. (1977) The determination of financial structure: The incentive signaling approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, pp.23-40. 29. Sarig, O., and Warga A. (1989) Some empirical estimates of the risk structure of interest rates, Journal of Finance, 44, pp. 1351-1360. 30. Stulz, R. and Johnson, H. (1985) An analysis of secured debt, Journal of Financial Economics, 14, pp. 501-521. 31. Stulz, R. (1990) Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp.3-27. 32. Vernimmen, P., Quiry, P., Dallocchio, M., Fur, Y. L., Salvi, A. (2005) Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice, 6th edn. West Sussex: John Wiley Sons. Ltd.

Odysseus is an Epic Hero :: essays research papers

People are heroes in different ways for different reasons. American soldiers are heroes because they fight boldly for their country. Corrie Ten Boom is also a hero because she took risks and saved hundreds of Jews. Abraham Lincoln is another example of a hero because he fought for what he thought was right and helped free all slaves. Similarly, Odysseus, the main character in Homer’s epic poem The Odyssey, possesses all of these characteristics and many more, making him a true epic hero. First of all, Odysseus is brave and courageous, giving him the initiative to fulfill his goals. One example is when Odysseus confronts Skylla. Odysseus purposely â€Å"made [his] way along to the foredeck—thinking to see her first from there† (Homer 217). If he was scared, he would have hidden underneath the deck. But instead, Odysseus goes out to face the beast. Odysseus knows that Skylla is immortal and cannot die, yet he is brave enough to confront her. Next, Odysseus fights the suitors, who are courting Penelope in his palace. The suitors greatly outnumber Odysseus, but Odysseus still chooses to fight even though the odds are against him and he is able to win. He stands up against those who do wrong. Having the courage to fight, Odysseus defeats the suitors and fulfills his goal of regaining his palace. If Odysseus was a coward and did not fight, then the suitors would have eventually won Penelope, resulting in Odysseus losing his palace and his wife. Ma ny people have bravery and courage, but not many use it, as Odysseus does, to achieve their purpose. Secondly, Odysseus has great self-control, which allows him to deeply contemplate his decisions. Moments before Odysseus falls asleep, he spots a â€Å"covey of women laughing as they [slip] out†¦to the suitors’ beds† (Homer 375). Seeing this, Odysseus is angered and wants to kill every one of the suitors right then and there. But Odysseus retains his self-control and does not strike yet. At that moment, if he did strike, he would have lost because he would not have been prepared. He retains all his anger for the final battle with the suitors. In that battle, Odysseus is fully prepared and ready to fight, resulting in all the suitors’ deaths. Next, when Antinoos throws a footstool at Odysseus, â€Å"Odysseus only [shakes] his head, containing thoughts of bloody work† (Homer 326).

My Movie Script :: Movie Scripts

My Movie Script The year was 1925, when the beliefs of regular gals and folks were still extremely antiquated compare to the beliefs they have now. The main character was an 18 years old lesbian named Sam (short for Samantha) Johnson, who was from a working class family that lived in New York City. Her mom was a sweatshop worker, and her dad picked up garbage for a living. She had 7 brothers and sister because her parents did not believe in birth control (besides, birth control pills didn't exist then). Her family lived in a tiny one-room apartment in the Harlem district, and they lived day-to-day, paycheck to paycheck. Ever since Sam was a young child, she had been in love with the game of baseball. She loved anything and everything about baseball. She would collect baseball cards, catch baseball games on t.v, and read everything on her favorite baseball team, the Yankees. She bought her first baseball bat and glove when she was 16, she got the money by collecting soda cans and returning them to re cycling center for money. It took her almost 3 years to get the baseball bat and gloves, and she could only afford the cheapest kind. She was a terrific baseball player, which was surprising because she had never taken any lessons. I guess it is her gift. Everyday after the end of school, she would go to a baseball field behind her house to play baseball with her friends. Most of her friends were boys; she didn't have one single girl friend. Sam had always known that she was a lesbian, but she didn't come out to her parents till she was 16. Her parents were shocked at first, but now they accepted her for who she was. Sam hadn't told any of her friends about her being gay because she didn't think it was any of their business. It had been a life-long dream of Sam to join a major league baseball team, but she knew that she needed to finish high school first. In June of 1925, Sam finally graduated from high school. She told her parents that she wanted to try-out for a major league baseb all team. One of the main reasons was that Sam had hoped to earn money to help support her family. She knew how hard her parents had worked, and she realized she needed to contribute in one way.

Synchronous and Asynchronous Mode :: essays research papers

Synchronous and Asynchronous mode:   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  In telecommunication signaling within a network or between networks, synchronous signals are those that occur at the same clock rate when all clocks are based on a single reference clock. Synchronous communication requires that each end of an exchange of communication respond in turn without initiating a new communication.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  An asynchronous signal is one that is transmitted at a different clock rate than another signal. Asynchronous operation also means that a process operates independently of other processes, whereas synchronous operation means that the process runs only as a result of some other process being completed or handing off operation. Analog and Digital: Analog communication employs continuous transmission of an electromagnetic wave form that varies in frequency and amplitude. A digital communication system uses discontinuous transmission that may vary in frequency, amplitude and/or phase to represent binary data. Simplex and Duplex:   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  A communications network can provide many types of service. The most basic type of service is known as simplex. This service provides one-way communication. Examples of this type of service are TV distribution, and the transmission of burglar alarm messages.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Most networks transfer data in two directions and are known as duplex communications links. Duplex links are classified as either full duplex or half duplex (also known as two ways alternate), depending upon whether both local and remote nodes may simultaneously transmit, or whether one must wait for the other to finish before starting transmission. Serial and Parallel Transmission:   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  In telecommunication, serial transmission is the sequential transmission of the signal elements of a group representing a character or other entity of data. The characters are transmitted in a sequence over a single line, rather than simultaneously over two or more lines, as in parallel transmission. The sequential elements may be transmitted with or without interruption. A parallel link transmits several streams of data (representing particular bits of a stream of bytes) along multiple channels (wires, printed circuit tracks, optical fibres, etc.). Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP)and Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP):   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  SLIP and PPP are two communication protocols which allow a computer connected to a server via a serial line (such as a modem) to become an actual node on the internet. This allows you to run network applications on your home computer directly. While SLIP and PPP are largely similar, there are some key differences. PPP is a newer protocol, better designed, and more acceptable to the sort of people who like to standardize protocol specifications.

Gender Identity Essay

Gender identities are determined by biological, social and cognitive learning factors, these occur overtime and more times than most gender identity is determined in childhood and usually by the age of six to seven years of age. Biological factors can play a big role in shaping a child’s physical development, some researchers suggest or believe that the same sex hormones enable sexual organ differentiation in utero of which triggers puberty, later on other gender identity factors are social and environmental factors, some believe a child’s gender identity is affected by the way they are raised and their social environment. These factors can determine a child’s gender identity and whether they become bisexual, heterosexual or other factors and identities. Gender roles and sexism can be identified by social identity like the expectations of a person by what sex they may be like male or female some countries believe women stay home and take care of their husbands and children and stay hidden and silent , other countries like the us women and men are equal and both have basically the same types of careers such as construction workers, and most careers are not limited to gender identity , examples of these concepts is like the middle east women are not allowed to be seen or heard unless spoken to and in no such terms are they permitted to speak to or look at other men for these laws being broken they are punished severly. in the us women and men treat each other equally and women have the same legal rights as men, women are not treated as children were treated back years ago , women in the US live their lives as men do equally. So gender roles depend on what culture you live in. Differences in men and women in social environments and cognitively are very different, and in some cases are the same, men can go to a restaurant or a social club and take considerable risks where a women will be more shy and timid, as for problems when these arise men most likely look for solutions to their problems before talking to a friend or family member about them where a women will contemplate and look for answers with the family or friends they speak to. Men and women’s intelligence levels are basically the same and as for environment men and women’s biological differences may be due to the influences they are around like men watching football together or women at a needlepoint club, and their gender developments, as well as where they socialize men and women are distinctively different and the same but different due to the regulation of their hormones and the way their systems are different and the difference in their brain functions, men and women’s e motions are mechanically different. One biological perspective or evidence suggest that differences in verbal and spatial abilities memory, and aggression are linked, to differences in hormones secretions between males and females this claims gender identity as being influenced re all research by hormonal imprinting before birth, a person’s masculine or feminine traits can be described by whether a person see’s themselves as a man or a women and how society perceives them whether it be stereotyping, or social differences. The masculine and femininity continuums characteristics are defending an opinion or beliefs, being a provider, sexually aggressive, unemotional, logical, rational, intellectual, and stoic adventurous, and competiveness. Being a leader, and being self-sufficient and an organizer and being independent these are the ways of masculinity or feminism traits continuum, these can be described to fall into felinity as well as masculinity these are added traits to the continuum, caring for a child and other people, being empathetic or being indecisive, caring and affectionate, the way females and males differ in many ways men and women are the same, In conclusion to gender identity masculinity and feminism are described as degrees but are not absolute in all people there is no such thing as one hundred percent female or one hundred percent male, this is all a myth we all basically fall in both categories and our gender identity is not decided for us.